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Abstract—In the last decades, agile methods had a huge impact
on how software is developed. In many cases, this has led to
significant benefits, such as quality and speed of software deliv-
eries to customers. However, safety-critical systems have widely
been dismissed from benefiting from agile methods. Products
that include safety critical aspects are therefore faced with a
situation in which the development of safety-critical parts can
significantly limit the potential speed-up through agile methods,
for the full product, but also in the non-safety critical parts. For
such products, the ability to develop safety-critical software in
an agile way will generate a competitive advantage. In order
to enable future research in this important area, we present
in this paper a mapping of the current state of practice based
on a mixed method approach. Starting from a workshop with
experts from six large Swedish product development companies
we develop a lens for our analysis. We then present a systematic
mapping study on safety-critical systems and agile development
through this lens in order to map potential benefits, challenges,
and solution candidates for guiding future research.
Index Terms—Safety-critical systems, agile, continuous inte-
gration, continuous delivery, continuous deployment, systematic
mapping study
I. INTRODUCTION
A system is safety-critical if its failure can cause financial
loss, damage to the environment, injury to people and in some
cases, loss of lives [8], [3]. The use of software in safety-
critical systems has continuously increased to an extent where
software failures can impair system safety. Examples in the
automotive domain include software in a break system, which
in case of failure could result in unacceptable hazards, but also
active safety functions that override driver behavior in certain
situations to avoid a crash. Similar examples can be found in
other domains (e.g. railway [12], avionics [2])
Safety-critical systems (SCS) are heavily regulated and
require certification against industry standards by the relevant
governing body [13]. For that reason, they have to be designed
with safety in mind. However, as opposed to the hardware
where general safety design principles have been incorporated
into standards, the standards for development of safe software
are still developing. These standards, for instance ISO26262
for automotive, IEC61513 for nuclear, IEC62304 for medical
and DO-178B for avionics aim to ensure that best engineering
practice is followed and are often based on traditional, plan-
driven approaches [NHR13]1. This is related to the common
criticism that agile methods neglect upfront analysis with a
focus on scenarios for describing requirements [9]. Because
the standards are written like that and because people think that
agile methods are not suitable, SCS development is most of-
ten characterized by highly-structured, plan-driven approaches
such as V-model or waterfall [GPM10].
While agile methods have significantly changed the way
most software is developed, safety-critical software was widely
excluded from this trend [9]. Arguments for this exclusion
relate to the need for documenting safety cases and the
need to analyze and specify safety requirements upfront, both
thought to be in conflict with agile values. Thus, companies
have different approaches to develop software, depending on
whether it is safety-critical or not (e.g. allowing faster time
to market of non-critical software such as infotainment) [7].
Recently, however, the situation has changed through poten-
tially disruptive trends that significantly increase the need for
short development cycles and quick time to market. Complex
dynamic systems-of-systems require components of different
vendors to interact at runtime and the dynamic nature of such
environments can make continuous deployment a necessity
for product success and for maintaining functional safety, e.g.
in the automotive domain [10]. The huge attention given to
autonomous driving and intelligent vehicles has lead to a jump
in complexity of SCS. Companies like Tesla have demon-
strated how the ability to deploy new functions and explore
their performance in the field can yield huge advantages.
Software companies such as Google, Apple, and Amazon
have pushed in the automotive market, increasing the need
to develop competencies in continuous software engineering.
Slowly, companies developing SCS realize the competitive
advantages that agility can provide [CWR10].
Existing reviews on agile development and safety [4],
[CWR10] mostly focus on determining whether agile methods
can improve embedded systems development [4] in general
and on how these agile methods are being adopted in these
environments. Kaisti et al.’s study [4] does not particularly fo-
cus on safety-critical systems whereas Cawley et al. [CWR10],
1In this paper, we use numbered references for regular citations and
abbreviated style for primary papers of the mapping study.
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with a focus on regulated environments, found few works
indicating a low but growing adoption of agile methods. Thus,
it is about time to investigate the state of supporting agile and
continuous development of safety-critical software.
In order to enable future research in this important area,
we present in this paper a mapping of the current state of
practice based on a mixed method approach. Starting from
a workshop with experts from six large Swedish product
development companies, we develop a lens for our analysis.
The aim of this mapping study is to evaluate and present the
combination of agile development methods and SCS. Our goal
is to provide a map that can enable future research and method
development for researchers and practitioners. Specifically, we
map suggested benefits, challenges, and solution candidates as
well as their relation to up-front analysis, just-in-time activities
of agile teams, and infrastructure to support these. We aim to
answer the following research questions.
RQ1: What research exists about agile development of SCS?
RQ2: What are the key benefits of applying agile methods and
practices in SCS development?
RQ3: What challenges exist with agile development of SCS?
RQ4: What solution candidates (e.g. principles and practices)
promise to address challenges with respect to agile develop-
ment of SCS?
Thus, this paper contributes an overview of existing re-
search, potential benefits, challenges, and solution candidates
of agile development of SCS. We discuss our findings in three
dimensions: The necessity of up-front analysis, the ability to
shift effort into just-in-time activities, and the potential of
better infrastructure to support these. We expect this contri-
bution to be of value for practitioners aiming to optimize
their processes as well as for researchers who may base future
research on our synthesis.
II. METHODOLOGY
In order to provide the required context while answering
our research questions, two complimentary activities have been
used; a cross-company workshop and a mapping study. This
section provides an elaboration on these two processes.
The Cross-Company Workshop: We started to get inter-
ested in the interplay of agile methods and SCS based on
ongoing collaborations and research projects on continuous
integration and deployment. Through this existing network,
we invited experts responsible for adoption of continuous
integration, continuous deployment, and agile methods as well
as safety experts from large Swedish companies to a work-
shop on SCS in continuous software engineering. During this
workshop, representatives from six companies attended. We
presented a very preliminary screening of literature, followed
by presentations from industry participants. We then had an
open discussion through which we arranged the information
presented and agreed on critical aspects to be further inves-
tigated. From this activity, we derived a lens for conducting
our mapping study to guide our research. We use this lens
to provide an overview of research in the field, specifically
focusing on identifying proposed benefits, challenges, and
TABLE I
NUMBER OF PAPERS FOUND, EXCLUDED AND INCLUDED
Inclusion/exclusion criterion Number of documents
Excluded Included
Search from 2001 to 2017 1986
Limit results to subject Computer
Science in Scopus
−1420 546
Exclude documents without authors −81 465
Exclude non-english documents −6 458
Exclusion based on title and
abstract
−391 69
- Document mentions safety but not in the agile development context.
- Document discusses agile without a particular focus on SCS.
- The subject area was not software engineering or development.
- The document is not peer reviewed.
Criteria based on full text −35 33+ 1
- Exclude documents where full text could not be obtained.
- Exclude documents to which an extended version was found and could be included.
- Exclude documents that do not allow extraction of context information.
- Include documents presenting an experience report.
- Include documents presenting a technical solution paper or an experiment.
- Include documents presenting a case study with students or practitioners.
- Include other documents (e.g. short papers) that include industry experience.
- Include papers obtained by snowballing given they meet the above criteria.
potential solutions and to discuss these findings based on
their relevance to upfront analysis (i.e. activities to be done
before agile teams can continuously add value through agile
development methods), just-in-time activities (i.e. activities
done during agile development sprints), and long lasting
infrastructure beyond a single project.
The mapping study: The key steps in the mapping study
followed guidelines by Petersen et al. [11] while also borrow-
ing some concepts from the established method of systematic
literature reviews [5]. Kitchenham and Charters [6] outlined
three phases of performing systematic reviews, i.e., planning,
conducting and reporting the review. These phases were later
simplified by Pertersen et al. [11] into five stages that include:
defining research questions (see Section 1), conducting a
search for primary studies, screening primary studies based
on inclusion/exclusion criteria, classifying the primary studies,
and data extraction and aggregation. These are explained in the
subsections that follow.
A. Search strategy
Basing on our research questions, we selected the major
search terms; "safety-critical systems" and "agile develop-
ment". We then adapted the PICO (Population, Intervention,
Comparison and Outcome) criteria proposed by Kitchenham
and Charters [6] to construct the search terms used in our final
search. With respect to population, we include terms related
to safety-critical systems. These are synonyms or terms related
to the major term and include safety-critical software, safety,
safety critical, regulated, regulation or software intensive. With
respect to intervention, we included terms relating to agile
development and agile methods. These include agile, agility,
continuous delivery, continuous deployment, continuous in-
tegration, scrum, xp, agile method, agile process and agile
practices. Specifically, we relied on a literature review on agile
methods [1] to select most commonly used search terms. We
did not use the term ‘software development’ in our search since
it was too specific and limiting, even though it is the context
in which we are working. We do not aim to compare methods
and therefore did not use the comparison criteria nor did we
use the outcomes criteria since the scope of the outcomes of
this study is hard to limit. A pilot literature search was then
performed to verify whether omission or addition of one or
more search terms could lead to a decrease or increase in
the documents returned. Search terms that did not add any
new documents were dropped and others kept. After several
iterations, the following search string was defined:
TITLE-ABS-KEY(agile OR agility OR "continuous integration" OR "con-
tinuous deployment" OR "continuous delivery" OR scrum OR "agile
practices" OR xp) AND TITLE-ABS-KEY("safety-critical systems" OR
"safety-critical software" OR safety OR "safety critical" OR regulated OR
regulation OR "software intensive")
B. Inclusion and Exclusion criteria
Using the search string obtained, we performed an au-
tomated search on Elsevier Scopus (www.scopus.com), a
database indexing many relevant venues and journals. The
search returned 1986 papers which were then limited to the
’Computer Science’ subject in Scopus leaving 546 papers.
From these, all duplicates, editorials and panel paper were
removed leaving 465 papers. The papers that were included
were those that presented any kind of empirical study dealing
with application of agile methods in a safety-critical environ-
ment, which were written in English and which were published
from 2001, when the agile manifesto was launched, to 2017.
On the other hand, studies were excluded if they were
pure discussion and opinion papers, duplicates (e.g. conference
paper extended into journal), or if their main focus was not
agile development in SCS. A summary of the selection criteria
and as well as the percentage of the paper excluded and
included based on our criteria are shown in Table I.
After removing the 6 non-english papers, the first author
went through the titles and abstracts of all remaining 458
papers to determine their relevance for the study. The titles
and abstracts were taken together since from the preliminary
search, we realised that some studies’ titles are not that explicit
and could lead to elimination of relevant studies. In this step
391 papers were excluded, since their title and abstract were
clearly not about agile software development and SCS. In
order to increase reliability of our study, we had a random
sample of 20 papers rated by three of the other authors and
computed an inter-rater agreement (Fleiss Kappa κ = 0.595).
All disagreements were discussed and resolved among the
researchers, leading to an agreed result of 69 papers. Then, the
first two authors went through the full texts of these remaining
69 papers collaboratively and selected 33 papers based on
the inclusion and exclusion criteria in Table I, to which we
added one more paper identified through snowballing [14] for
consideration (indicated with +1 in Table I), resulting in a
total of 34 papers.
C. Data extraction and Synthesis
With respect to our research questions, we then ex-
tracted metadata, practices used, principles followed, chal-
lenges faced, and (potential) benefits from the 34 selected
TABLE II
TABLE: DATA EXTRACTION TEMPLATE
Data item Description
Title The title of the paper.
Authors The full names of the authors.
Year Year of publication.
Venue Name of publication venue.
Publ. type Journal, conference or workshop.
Summary The main content of the paper.
Benefits The benefits of agile development in SCS.
Challenges Problems faced with agile development in SCS.
Practices The practices used in that safety + agile environment.
Principles The principles they follow if any.
papers based on a predefined template for data extraction
presented in Table II. This template allowed us to extract all
the information we need for analysis into a MS Excel spread-
sheet. The data obtained was analyzed both quantitatively and
qualitatively. We used the themes agreed during the workshop
with company experts, while basing a thematic approach, to
group the results obtained into the upfront, just-in-time and
infrastructure. For synthesis, the metadata was summarised
and proposed benefits, challenges and potential solutions were
collated, analysed, and categorized among the researchers.
D. Limitations and Threats to Validity
Our literature search was limited to the Elsevier Scopus
database. Even though Elsevier claims that Scopus is the most
comprehensive database of peer-reviewed research abstracts2,
additional databases could have provided more relevant stud-
ies. However, this was mitigated by snowballing, where the ci-
tations of the included papers were reviewed for consideration,
leading to one additional paper. In order to mitigate potential
misinterpretations of papers, we relied on more than one
researcher in each key step of our research. Where appropriate,
we calculate inter-rater agreement. Despite these efforts, we
may have overlooked relevant papers or misinterpreted them
in our synthesis. We aimed for a transparent description of our
method to allow for recovery if this should be the case.
III. FINDINGS
A. RQ1: Existing research about agile development of SCS
Based on our search terms in combination with the defined
inclusion and exclusion criteria, we selected 34 papers3. As
shown in Table III, we did not select any paper before 2006
and there has been a significant increase of papers ( ) in
2016 and 2017, supporting our assumption that agile for SCS
becomes increasingly important. While we did find a number
of articles in journals and magazines (5) as well as conference
papers (22), most of them are quite short. Together with a
considerate number of workshop papers (7) this suggests that
the research field is still young. In Table III, we also give a
rough characterization of the main concern of the selected
2http://www.elsevier.com/elsevier-products/scopus
3All papers: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/19s4aTpB0Yy38mnYUh1F1TiQqPZEdHD1ZYP8VdC2QQdE/
edit?usp=sharing
papers of each year, based on concepts highlighted in the
abstracts and keywords. While the first papers in 2006-2010
were very positive about agile methods, consecutive papers
discuss more and more difficulties. From 2011 on, papers
aim to systematically analyse and overcome such obstacles.
We observe proposals to enhance (plan-driven) methods for
developing SCS with agile practices, but also suggestions to
enhance agile methods with concepts from safety standards.
B. RQ2: Key benefits of applying agile methods to SCS
With respect to RQ2, we derived key benefits from the
papers and grouped them into the following categories:
Efficient use of available information: Agile methods advo-
cate responding to change over following a plan and encourage
developers to use available information to start or continue
their work [SM16b]. Even early sprints aim to deliver working
software which helps to identify and address technical risks,
e.g. with respect to safety cases, early [SW13]. This promises
to remove the need for heavy upfront design [WW16].
Improved stakeholder involvement: In SCS development,
coordination and understanding between the relevant stake-
holders is of utmost importance. Agile methods enable contin-
uous communication between different stakeholders [MSL16],
thus allowing them to contribute to development [SM16b].
This keeps the team better aligned with stakeholders and
ensures that user needs and intended use are well under-
stood [SW13], increases customer orientation [HWS17], and
strengthens the trust between stakeholders [Hee14].
Improved safety culture: In an agile setting, the available
information can be used to get an early start on the safety
analysis [SM16b]. This helps in identifying possible barriers
to safety which also makes it easier to discover and correct
faulty system requirements [MSL16]. The practice of frequent
integration of software and hardware elements supports early
identification of potential issues [RHJS09]. The early focus on
safety improves the level of safety awareness within the team
and among stakeholders, thus improving the safety culture.
Improved management of changing requirements: Agile
methods tend to focus on features during development. To-
gether with the iterative nature of agile methods, this signif-
icantly reduces requirements churn [RHJS09] and provides
teams with the ability to manage new and/or changing re-
quirements [HWS17]. While most safety requirements may not
change that often, it is important to understand the impact a
change, for example in functional requirements, would have on
safety. This enables teams to re-plan their sprints basing on the
most recent understanding of the system under development
and its requirements [MSL16].
Improved prioritisation: Agile methods generally give the
advantage of better prioritisation during the handling or man-
aging of changing requirements [SHMH14]. With prioritisa-
tion, focus is put on the highest value feature first, which leads
to more thorough definition and validation of the important
requirements [SW13]. This allows to put safety related features
into the center of attention when developing SCS.
Mapping of functional and safety requirements: Studies pro-
pose maintaining specific backlogs for safety and functional
requirements such that the development takes safety into con-
text from the start. This practice supports a mapping between
the functional and safety requirements [MSL16] and seamless
integration of safety and software engineering [VW17].
Reduced costs: Agile methods encourage simple designs
which in turn produce simpler software with reduced devel-
opment and maintenance cost [MSL16]. The high response to
requirements’ changes that agile methods advocate helps to
reduce the amount of rework [MMC14] and shortens overall
time spent on development as well as the cost that would
be spent on redoing the work [RHJS09], [HWS17], [GŁ12].
High development costs are a big challenge in developing SCS
and the ability to reduce cost and lead time for bringing new
safety-critical functions on the market will allow to increase
the speed at which organizations learn on how to make such
functions even safer.
Better test cases: The iterative development allows the team
to only prepare and maintain documents that are needed either
for development or certification [MSL16]. This also produces
a lower number of tests, but with better focus on their intent,
making it easier to understand and debug [RHJS09].
Improved quality: SCS development is a quality matter
which is usually checked through rigour in testing. In agile
methods, the continuous availability of working software and
early response to changes facilitates ongoing testing, which
reduces risk to product quality [RHJS09], [SW13], [GŁ12].
Rottier and Rodrigues report that the use of iterative develop-
ment together with Test Driven Development (TDD) produced
fairly consistent high quality code for their product [RR08].
Improved opportunities for reuse: Good adaption of agile
methods helps building new frameworks that can be reused
in later phases or projects, which will improve efficiency
[MSL16], [RR08]. Such frameworks can also enable the reuse
of test cases and reduce the overall workload [Wol12].
C. RQ3: Challenges with agile development of SCS
Several of our selected papers identified challenges relating
to use of agile methods in SCS development, which we group
and summarize into the following themes:
Difficult to manage knowledge flow between many stake-
holders: There are many stakeholders in SCS development,
including other engineering disciplines, sub-system suppliers,
users, and external bodies such as certification authorities
[PGC+11], [GŁ12]. Managing communication among these
stakeholders is challenging. While agile methods may improve
stakeholder involvement (see above), stakeholders of SCS
are used to communication through documents. The lack of
focus on documentation in agile methods may lead to unclear
safety documentation, thus hindering effective communication
between the different stakeholders [WRW17], [WBW17].
Safety standards facilitate a waterfall mindset: Safety stan-
dards are prescriptive and often described with a waterfall-
based process in mind [NHR13]. With this mindset, regulated
domains often value effectiveness of waterfall processes over
TABLE III
OVERVIEW OF PAPERS
Year Count Journal Conference/WS Topics
2017 5 EuroSPI [DKS+17], ICSE [VW17],
Profes [WRW17], XP [HWS17], XP
WS [WBW17]
Hazard analysis, Safety Assurance, Fitting Safety into Scrum, S-Scrum,
Documentation, Safety Story/Epic, Continuous Safety-Builds, Continuous Delivery
2016 9 Crosstalk [McM16] FedCSIS [ŁG16], ICSSP [TMLB16],
RAMS [MSL16], SAFECOMP
[SM16a], XP [HHS+16], SE WS
[WW16], XP WS [DK16], [SM16b]
Agile and CMMI, Agile Principles in Safety Frameworks, Safety Principles in
Scrum, Safe Scrum, Early Safety Analysis, Generic Failure Modes, Domain
Specific Fault Trees, Compliance, Incremental Design, Safety Case, safety guided
design, safety validation
2015 1 ICCNEEE [AETO15] systematic iterative approach, safety modular decomposition, safety argument
2014 4 eChallenges [KKK14], SAFECOMP
[SHMH14], SPICE [MMC14], XP
[Hee14]
agile (in-process) change impact analysis, hybrid: plan-driven and agile,
documentation in agile, quality assurance in agile, compliance by design
2013 4 BI&T [SW13] ICSE [FSOO13], Profes [NHR13],
SERENE WS [GŁ13]
human factors, good documentation, certification cost, component reuse, iterative
processes, agile and regulation, conformance
2012 4 (CSCI [GŁ12])1 SPICE [MMC12], FormSERA WS
[Wol12], ISSREW WS [JLP12]
risks of agile, documentation, traceability, regulatory compliance, up front planning,
managing multiple releases, formal methods, requirements analysis, change
management
2011 2 IJCCBS [PGC+11],
SPE [GEI+11]
can agile processes be applicable to SCS? empirical process control, right amount
of ceremony
2010 2 AGILE [GPM10], LESS [CWR10] minimal up front design, iterative development, Lean/Agile adoption for SCS,
hybrid processes
2009 1 AGILE [RHJS09] agile is best suitable for FDA regulated medical devices
2008 1 AGILE [RR08] test automation, requirements validation, reporting, performance metrics
2006 1 XP [WBHV06] agile helps with changing requirements of SCS, effectiveness of agile practices
changes over time
1) Paper added through snowballing since not included in scopus results.
the flexibility of agile methods [FSOO13]. For example, many
safety standards demand that one person must not create and
review the same artifact [NHR13], [JLP12], [KKK14], while
agile methods favor cross-functional teams. This mismatch of
the mindset causes risks to potential compliance [SW13].
The waterfall mindset also shows a strong focus on doc-
umentation. In SCS, documentation is required for show-
ing regulation compliance [MMC12] and is the preferred
way of communication with certification bodies [PGC+11].
Documentation is also the primary evidence for traceability
[FSOO13]. Agile methods are often reported to suffer from
this focus on documentation [WBW17], [KKK14], [FSOO13],
[PGC+11], [TMLB16], [Hee14] as extensive documentation
will diminish advantages of agility while lack of documenta-
tion will lead to insufficient traceability.
Lack of trust in agile methods: Since agile methods do not
give clear guidelines for project monitoring and control, it is
hard to determine the sufficient level of evidence to present
[DK16] for certification. Thus, it appears difficult to estimate
effort and through the “unstructured nature” of agile methods,
the amount of effort for delivering a feature seems to be
underestimated [RR08]. The maturity of agile methods is hard
to compare to CMM and ISO standards [PGC+11] and many
managers are not convinced about business benefits of agile
methods [FSOO13]. There is also doubt about whether agile
methods can provide sufficiently rigorous testing [PGC+11].
Upfront planning: Safety standards suggest upfront design,
hazard identification, and analysis. With agile methods, it
is hard to determine how much time is enough for upfront
planning [MMC12], [WRW17] and consequently difficult to
identify all of the ways in which software can contribute
to system level hazards up front [DK16]. Thus, there is the
perception that planning in agile methods is insufficient for
SCS development [WBW17], [FSOO13]. The aim for short
upfront design and for analysing requirements just in time
during iterations puts time pressure for determining the safety
requirements and makes it difficult to evaluate the quality
of the safety arguments [GPM10], [WRW17] which could
impede certification [GŁ12]. Even more, attempts to include
safety in agile can shift focus from customer value towards
verification and validation efforts [SM16a].
Flexibility vs. Safety: Agile methods do not provide practical
guidelines for change impact analysis [SHMH14], yet they
provide flexibility in managing requirements. Every update
therefore calls for relentless testing and strict configuration
management [HWS17] and un-coordinated software changes
can lead to increased complexity as the project progresses
[WBHV06]. In addition, it is difficult to manage requirements
that change iteratively [Hee14].
D. RQ4: Solution candidates (e.g. principles and practices)
for challenges with respect to agile development of SCS
We present solutions collected from the selected papers in
Table IV. Some of these solutions relate to enhancing agile,
others to complementing safety, which emphasizes the aim of
these works to bring both worlds closer together. We organized
the proposed solutions in different categories, starting with
principles that were suggested to provide guidance for agile
development of SCS. These are rather abstract guidelines or
goals to strive for when implementing an agile way of working
with SCS. In addition, we identify proposed solutions with
respect to process and release planning and roles. We then
continue with more concrete practices that were proposed
in literature, which we grouped in relation to testing and
continuous development, regular meetings, and broader safety
engineering practices.
TABLE IV
SOLUTION CANDIDATES IN LITERATURE
Solution cand. Description
Principles
Customer involvement
at all levels
On-site customer [JLP12] should be part of hazard analysis, safety analysis, SSRS requirements phase, sprint reviews [DK16], [SM16a] at all levels of
product development [SM16b], [DKS+17], [SW13]. Product owner can act as the on-site customer [FSOO13]. Frequent contact with the customer [Hee14]
hand regular communication [WBHV06] allows team to react on the specific needs of the customers.
Risk management Identify high level risks in initial phase [RR08] and consider risks during development [KKK14], [RR08]. Ensure that software is truly safe by
employing a risk-based approach to planning [PGC+11], testing [KKK14], verification [PGC+11] and validation [FSOO13].
Process and Release planning
Iterative / incremental
development
Develop components iteratively [GPM10], [PGC+11], [MMC12], [HHS+16] in fixed and short iterations delivering functional software [RHJS09], [WBHV06].
Do iterative safety analysis [VW17], [AETO15], have an incremental safety validation plan [SM16a], [RR08] and incremental safety case [SM16a].
Backlog management Team should maintain a groomed, refined, and prioritised backlog [GŁ13], [McM16], [GEI+11], [SM16a] with two parts: one for functional requirements
and one for safety requirements [AETO15], [DK16], [MSL16], [WW16], [RR08], [Wol12], [HHS+16]
User stories Used for product definition [RR08], [KKK14], high level requirements [HWS17], upfront planning [MMC12], and as basis for safety analysis [MSL16].
Refine with use case diagrams or textual use cases [SM16b].
Essential upfront plan Do architectural design and hazard/safety analysis up front [AETO15], [GPM10], [DKS+17]. Use hazard lists or checklists from literature [SM16b]; perform
analysis of previous failure reports for process hazard analysis on the user stories [SM16b]. Use FMEA [NHR13] for decision support [SHMH14].
Formal change control
and prioritisation
Implement formal change control process [RR08] with upfront lightweight CIA [SHMH14] to assign quality scores to all requirements [DKS+17] and
to prioritize requirements [FSOO13], [SW13]. Maintain CIA report (issues raised and resolved) [SM16b], [SM16a]. Formalise design reviews for validation
and verification [RHJS09]
Roles
Self-organising teams Teams are self-organized and empowered to manage daily tasks of producing software on their own [SW13], [MMC14]. Rely on collective code
ownership [WBHV06] to allow the whole team to help and keep track of who did what [NHR13].
Expert knowledge Include expert knowledge in team [GŁ13], [GŁ12]: QA [DKS+17] or safety experts [SM16a], [WW16], [WRW17] or nominated safety team member [DK16].
Testing and Continuous Development
Reviews A team of peers with assigned roles performs code reviews [GEI+11], [FSOO13] or more formal technical reviews [AETO15].
Acceptance and unit
testing
Do unit tests [WBHV06], [RHJS09] and acceptance tests [WBHV06], [MMC14], [PGC+11], [GŁ13] once a number of iterations have been completed [MMC12].
Apply Test driven development (TDD) to establish high test coverage [JLP12], [WBHV06], [MMC14], [HWS17], [WW16], [Wol12], [HHS+16], [CWR10], [RR08] and
increased regression testing [McM16]. Tests should be automated [McM16], [RR08], risk-based [KKK14], continuous and extensive [GEI+11], [GŁ12], and
should include safety tests [VW17].
Continuous Build Apply continuous integration [JLP12], [WBHV06], [KKK14], [HWS17], [PGC+11], [FSOO13], [HHS+16], [SW13], [GEI+11] supported by automation [RHJS09] and
include continuous safety builds [VW17]. Strive for continuous compliance [FSOO13] in order to facilitate continuous delivery [HWS17], [FSOO13].
Coding standard Keep high coding standards that all developers should adhere to [JLP12], [HWS17], [GŁ13], supported by pair programming [CWR10], [JLP12], [WBHV06],
[MMC14], [PGC+11], [Wol12] and refactoring [HHS+16], [JLP12], [PGC+11], [Hee14], e.g. with help of refactoring stories [FSOO13]
Regular meetings
Daily meetings Daily meetings [FSOO13], [HHS+16] to provide visibility of safety requirements satisfaction status [DK16] and promote collective ownership [RHJS09].
Daily stand-ups provide feedback, communication, and coordination to manage technical and organizational dependencies [WBHV06]. Establish
weekly goals and review them at the end of each week during the daily meeting to focus on team objectives [RHJS09].
Sprint review Demonstrate to product owner what has been done by the team [SHMH14], [Wol12], [FSOO13], [HHS+16], [McM16], [WBW17] and to create awareness of
activities among team members [Wol12]. Involve all relevant stakeholders [DK16]. Include hazard analysis (ibid) and acceptance criteria in review
[WBW17], [SW13], [MMC14] and implement it as independent process for good quality assurance [KKK14].
Planning meetings and
retrospectives
Create software development plan [KKK14] based on features [RHJS09] at the planning meeting [SHMH14], [HHS+16]. Document chosen modelling
approach, implementation language, development environment and assessment tools [DK16] and determine safety requirements [WRW17]. Combine
sprint planning with retrospective [SM16b], [RHJS09], [McM16] to empirically improve estimations [FSOO13].
Safety Engineering Practices
Traceability support Use Traceability to support certification as well as claims that requirements have been met [MMC12]. Use appropriate tools for automation [FSOO13].
Use trace information to determine which tests need to be rerun [SM16b].
Standard Operating
Procedures (SOPs)
Rely on SOPs to improve quality management with clear guidelines to developers [KKK14] and use them as management records for achieving some
compliance objectives in agile [HWS17]. The records should include safety standards the team should be familiar with [KKK14] and short written
policies for documentation, review and testing, developed by the team [KKK14].
E. Synthesis of Findings
In Table V we give an overview of key benefits, challenges,
principles, and practices discussed in literature and in Fig. 1
we show how the selected papers are distributed over these
categories. The majority of work relates to just-in-time activi-
ties, such as analysis and management of functional or system
safety. Fewer selected papers relate to upfront analysis, which
in many publications is taken for granted. The smallest amount
of papers relates to long-term aspects and infrastructure that
lasts beyond an individual project.
It is noteworthy that solution candidates dominate for up-
front and just-in-time aspects. In contrast, we found relatively
fewer papers relating to solutions with respect to long-term
and infrastructure aspects, especially in relation to the amount
of challenges found in this category. We found only few papers
that discuss a trade-off between upfront analysis and just-
in-time analysis or attempt to push more activities from the
upfront phases into continuous development.
This result resonates well with the discussions during our
initial workshop. Our industry participants highlighted the
following challenges that we did not yet found sufficiently
supported in the selected papers.
Upfront: Our industry participants saw benefits in upfront
analysis for agile development of SCS, e.g. with respect to
reducing dependencies and confining safety-critical or secret
software (e.g. due to IP constraints). Challenges relate to a
TABLE V
SUMMARY OF LITERATURE
Benefits Total Pri. Papers
Improved stakeholder involvement 5
Reduced costs 5
Improved quality 4
Efficient Use of available information 3
Improved safety culture 3
Improved opportunities for reuse 3
Improved management of changing requirements 3
Improved prioritisation 2
Mapping of functional and safety requirements 2
Better test cases 2
Challenges
Strong focus on documentation 9
Upfront planning 9
Safety standards to facilitate a waterfall mindset 6
Lack of trust in agile methods 5
Flexibility vs Safety 4
Difficult to manage knowledge flow between stakeholders 4
Practices and principles
Acceptance and unit testing 18
Coding standard 14
Continuous build 11
Backlog management 11
Iterative development 10
Sprint review 10
Planning meetings and retrospectives 9
Formal change control and prioritisation 8
Expert knowledge 7
Customer involvement at all levels 7
User stories 6
Essential upfront plan 6
daily meetings 5
Self-organising teams 4
Traceability support 3
Risk management 3
Reviews 2
Standard operating procedures 2
lack of experience with continuous development of existing
products in contrast to developing new products.
Just-in-time: Industry participants saw benefits with respect
to managing continuously changing dependencies and require-
ments. The ability to do continuous assessment and certifica-
tion was seen as a real enabler. Also, agile documentation, i.e.
focusing on the essential, product-related information was seen
as a potential benefit. Challenges relate to constructing the big
picture from local information, quality assurance and assessors
with waterfall mindset, and the question whether product or
process based evidence for safety would be the better choice.
With respect to solutions, they showed big hopes in applying
Benefits (RQ2)
Challenges (RQ3)
Solutions (RQ4)
Upfront analysis Just-in-time
Long-lasting /
infrastructure
31 6
1012
6
12
19
85
Fig. 1. Bubble chart with numbers of papers per category.
specification by example and hardening sprints.
Long-term/infrastructure: In this category, our participants
saw the biggest need for new concepts. Potential benefits could
include investment in infrastructure with long-term benefits,
organization-level assessment, tools to check dependencies,
and semi-automation for traceability. The biggest challenges
were seen in a pay-per-product mentality, lack of traceability,
too many layers of requirements (making it impossible to keep
safety requirements up-to-date in continuous development),
certification of tools (which will slow down their evolution),
old assessment frameworks, and lack of trust in agile maturity.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this paper, we provide a systematic mapping of agile
development of SCS. We contribute an overview of research
papers discussing experience from industry from 2001 to
2017 in the hope that this will enable future research in this
area. Our synthesis is based on iterative analysis of selected
papers and discussions in a workshop with experts from six
major Swedish product companies. We found that potential
benefits, challenges, and proposed solutions relate to upfront,
just-in-time, or long-term and infrastructural aspects. While
companies continue to struggle in all three areas, we see a need
for future research specifically in two areas: a) Investigation
of trade-offs between effort done upfront and just-in-time
together with guidelines on how to shift more effort into just-
in-time analysis; b) Investigation on how to establish beneficial
infrastructure for long-term support.
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